This paper is an extended commentary on a recent British Columbia Court of Appeal Decision, William v British Columbia, 2012 BCCA 285. It rehearses and critiques the central debate between the appellant and respondent regarding the quality or character of physical occupation necessary to successfully ground an Aboriginal title claim under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Ultimately, it argues that the Court of Appeal erred in its endorsement of a "site-specific" understanding of sufficient occupancy, and further, that the central debate itself is orthogonal to the true concern underlying the occupancy requirement. It concludes with an alternative test for sufficient occupancy which is more consistent with the previous jurisprudence and the goals of Aboriginal title and Canadian Aboriginal rights writ large.
Wilson 3 strictly defined, intensely used areas, such as particular hunting grounds, "salt licks, or "particular rocks or promontories used for netting salmon." 10 In its reasons, the Court of Appeal also held that the appellant's position could be characterized fairly as "territorial,"
and that claims of this nature departed from what was contemplated as sufficient occupancy in Delgamuukw. Furthermore, it held that such 'territorial' claims were inconsistent with the overall rationale of Aboriginal title and the broader reconciliatory goal of Aboriginal rights writ large.
11
The end result of this interpretive dilemma will have important jurisprudential consequences. As noted by the Court of Appeal itself, the William case is an "extraordinary one:" a tremendous amount of resources has been expended by both sides, leading to a vigorous, difficult, and complex history of litigation, and the construction of a "very complete record." 12 For these reasons, the Court of Appeal describes it as being "in many respects a test case on the issue of Aboriginal title" presenting "a suitable vehicle for development of the law." 13 The Court of Appeal's decision has been appealed to and heard by the Supreme Court of Canada, with a decision expected before the end of the year. If the Court were to endorse the respondent's position-which is essentially coextensive with the British Columbia Court of Appeal's findings-Aboriginal title claims would become extremely difficult to make out, perhaps further hindering the overall goal of the constitutional protection of Aboriginal rights in section 35 of the 10 William at para 221. 11 Ibid at paras 214, 219-239. 12 Ibid at paras 165, 26. 13 Ibid at para 165.
Constitution Act, 1982 14 : the reconciliation of historical Aboriginal and modern rights held under general Canadian law.
15
The goal of this paper is to rehearse and critique the Court of Appeal's reasons for endorsing the respondent's site-specific model of sufficient occupation, and to offer an alternative method of answering the sufficient occupation question arising out of
Delgamuukw. Ultimately, it will be argued that the three arguments offered by the court do not, without more, establish that the site specific-model is any more desirable or jurisprudentially defensible than the one offered by the appellants.
Furthermore, it will be argued that either position misapprehends the nature of the occupancy test arising out the Supreme Court's decisions in Delgamuukw and Marshall;
Bernard. The question of sufficient occupancy should be understood not by measuring a claim's concordance with an acceptable category of claims, site-specific or otherwise.
Rather, it should be a fact-specific inquiry aiming to determine if the occupancy proven on the evidence comports with the broader and more fundamental goals of Aboriginal title. That is, the court must determine, on the facts, if the occupancy claimed is sufficient to warrant an overall finding that the claimant group's connection with the land is of central significance to the Aboriginal people making the claim.
The paper will proceed as follows. First, we will rehearse and critique each of the arguments for the site-specific model forwarded by the Court of Appeal in William. In addition to demonstrating that the site-specific model is not as tenable as the Court of
Appeal suggests, our analysis will also reveal the error of attempting to parse questions of 14 Constitution Act, 1982 , being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982 , c.11 ["Constitution Act, 1982 . 15 Brian Slattery, "The Metamorphosis of Aboriginal Title," The Canadian Bar Review, vol 85, 2006 pg 281 [Metamorphosis] .
sufficient occupancy through categories of acceptable and non-acceptable title claims.
Following this analysis, we will move to a constructive phase in which we suggest an alternative, flexible, and fact-specific standard for occupation, one which is consistent with the jurisprudential tests in Delgamuukw and Marshall; Bernard, and the broader reconciliatory goals of Aboriginal title.
We turn first to the Court of Appeal's reasons for endorsing the site-specific model. Emerging from the reasons are three distinct arguments, each of which the Court of Appeal seems to present as determinative of to the issue. These three arguments are adumbrated by the Court of Appeal in the following passage:
I also agree with the defendants that a territorial claim for Aboriginal title does not meet the tests in Delgamuukw and in Marshall; Bernard. Further, as I will attempt to explain, I do not see a broad territorial claim as fitting within the purposes behind s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 or the rationale for the common law's recognition of Aboriginal title. Finally, I see broad territorial claims as antithetical to the goal of reconciliation, which demands that, so far as possible, the traditional rights of First Nations be fully respected without placing unnecessary limitations on the sovereignty of the Crown or on the aspirations of all Canadians, Aboriginal and non-aboriginal. 16 The first argument is one of jurisprudential consistency, the claim being that a non-site specific claim (characterized as "territorial" in the above passage) does not satisfy the requirements set out in the previous leading cases on title. The Court of Appeal points to several passages in both Delgamuukw and Marshall; Bernard to substantiate this claim. On the contrary, and with respect, a careful analysis of these passages shows that this conclusion is not warranted. 16 Supra note 1 at para 219. The Court of Appeal emphasizes Lamer CJC's use of the word "definite" in Delgamuukw to draw its conclusion that specific, intensely used sites are the sufficient occupancy standard:
In particular, I note that the examples of title lands given at para. 149 are well-defined, intensively used areas. The reference to hunting, fishing, and other resource extraction activities is coupled with a specific description of the lands so used as "definite" tracts of land. I agree with British Columbia's assertion that what was contemplated were specific sites on which hunting, fishing, or resource extraction activities took place on a regular and intensive basis.
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The Court of Appeal's argument here, seems correct if one accepts, without more, that the Court's use of "definite" in this context meant something like specifically bound, particular sites under heavy use. On what is given in the passage directly above, this may be a plausible conclusion. However, the rest of the paragraph 149, not referenced by the Court of Appeal, weakens the claim:
In considering whether occupation sufficient to ground title is established, "one must take into account the group's size, manner of life, material The second salient point with regards to the unstated portion of para 149 is what the guidance itself tells us about the occupancy issue. Lamer CJC chose to provide a list of factors to inform a court's analysis of occupation, each of which will depend on the facts of a particular aboriginal group and claim area, and not on the nature of the claim itself. That is, the Chief Justice's concern does not mandate that a specific type of claim will succeed and others will fail. Rather, the factors listed could plausibly inform a court's discretion in deciding whether some factual instance of occupancy, not the nature of the claim as site-specific or of a certain intensity, will ground title. 20 Supra note 2 at para 149 The only explicit reference to nomadic peoples in Delgamuukw occurs at paragraph 139.
It follows Lamer CJC's discussion of the relationship between Aboriginal title and Aboriginal rights writ large, in which he states that s. 35(1) rights fall along a spectrum with regards to their degree of connection with the land. At one end of the spectrum sit activity rights wholly disconnected from particular areas of land, which protect a group's ability to engage in culturally integral practices, customs and traditions, as affirmed in R v Van der Peet. 22 As noted in R v Adams, these certain activity rights may be more directly connected to the land, insofar as protection may be granted to engage in particular activities on specific tracts of land. 23 Finally, at the opposite end of the spectrum sits title itself, which is a right to the land itself. 24 After making the spectrum-of-rights point, he makes the reference to nomadic peoples highlighted by the Court of Appeal:
Because aboriginal rights can vary with respect to their degree of connection with the land, some aboriginal groups may be unable to make out a claim to title, but will nevertheless possess aboriginal rights that are recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1), including site-specific rights to engage in particular activities. As I explained in Adams, this may occur in the case of nomadic peoples who varied "the location of their settlements with the season and changing circumstances" (at para. 27). The fact that aboriginal peoples were non-sedentary, however (at para. 27) does not alter the fact that nomadic peoples survived through reliance on the land prior to contact with Europeans, and further, that many of the practices, customs, and traditions of nomadic peoples that took place on the land 21 William at para 222 [emphasis added]. 22 [1996] 2 SCR 507 [" Van der Peet"] . 23 [1996] 3 SCR 101 ["Adams"] . 24 Delgamuukw at para 138. Finally, with respect to Delgamuukw, I note Lamer C.J.C.'s comments at paras. 150 and 151 dealing with the need for a group to demonstrate that a piece of land was of central significance to their distinctive culture. He considered this to be a "crucial" part of the test for Aboriginal title, but found that it was unnecessary to treat it as a specific element of the proof of title, because any land that met the other criteria for Aboriginal title would, of necessity, be of central significance to the culture. That position is a sensible one if the occupation needed to found a claim for title is sitespecific; it is not, however, if undifferentiated land within a large territory is to be included in a title claim.
28
Here, the Court of Appeal is making an argument from internal consistency. Lamer CJC makes the statement that demonstration of the other criteria for title is sufficient to prove the crucial "central significance" requirement. The Court of Appeal argues that in order to make this statement intelligible, one of those other criteria, namely, sufficiency of occupancy, must be site-specific and not territorial. The unstated premise of this argument is that somehow, site-specific use itself indicates or is evidence of central significance. If we can accept that premise, and therefore, the former entails the latter, than the need for additional proof of the latter is redundant. Therefore, the Court of Appeal concludes, this passage indicates that the Delgamuukw court envisioned a sitespecific level of sufficient occupancy.
Again, as presented, the argument seems plausible. However, consider the relevant Delgamuukw passages referenced by the Court of Appeal in their entirety: 28 Supra note 1 at para 223.
In Van der Peet, I drew a distinction between those practices, customs and traditions of aboriginal peoples which were "an aspect of, or took place in" the society of the aboriginal group asserting the claim and those which were "a central and significant part of the society's distinctive culture" (at para. 55). The latter stood apart because they "made the culture of the society distinctive . . . it was one of the things that truly made the society what it was" (at para. 55, emphasis in original). The same requirement operates in the determina-tion of the proof of aboriginal title. As I said in Adams, a claim to title is made out when a group can demonstrate "that their connection with the piece of land . . . was of a central significance to their distinctive culture" (at para. 26).
Although this remains a crucial part of the test for aboriginal rights, given the occupancy requirement in the test for aboriginal title, I cannot imagine a situation where this requirement would actually serve to limit or preclude a title claim. The requirement exists for rights short of title because it is necessary to distinguish between those prac-tices which were central to the culture of claimants and those which were more incidental. However, in the case of title, it would seem clear that any land that was occupied pre-sovereignty, and which the parties have maintained a substantial connection with since then, is sufficiently important to be of central significance to the culture of the claimants. As a result, I do not think it is necessary to include explicitly this element as part of the test for aboriginal title. However, as careful readers will have noticed, Lamer CJC's explanation of the central significance redundancy cites both the requirements of occupancy ("occupied presovereignty) and sustained temporal connection ("which the parties have maintained a substantial connection with since then"). That is, Lamer CJC's conclusion that the central significance requirement is redundant in the case of Aboriginal title is based on the combined presence of both elements of the title test. It seems, on a straightforward reading, that it is the combination of these two prongs that allows the Chief Justice to make an inference of central significance, not just the satisfaction occupancy requirement. This makes intuitive sense, as neither prong, on its own, could ground an inference to central significance. Tracts of land may be occupied regularly for various reasons which may not entail "central significance," for instance, a specific path used to move between two actually culturally significant sites. Similarly, substantial connection over time may be the product of necessity: for instance, a certain food source's affinity for a particular area, and be comopletely unrelated to the identity of a particular Marshall; Bernard, as I read it, is even stronger in showing that Aboriginal title must be demonstrated on a site-specific rather than territorial basis. The majority expressly dealt with the question of whether hunting or fishing or the taking of other resources from land could found a title claim. At para. 58, it agreed that such activities could, where they were sufficiently regular and exclusive, be a basis for title. It also cautioned, however, that more typically, such activities will found only claims to specific Aboriginal rights.
The majority's equation of sufficient occupancy for Aboriginal title with the common law requirements to show title by virtue of possession is also important. It supports the views that title must be claimed on a sitespecific basis, and that a certain regularity and intensity of presence is needed before it will count as "occupancy". It follows from the requirement of exclusive occupation that exploiting the land, rivers or seaside for hunting, fishing or other resources may translate into aboriginal title to the land if the activity was sufficiently regular and exclusive to comport with title at common law. However, more typically, seasonal hunting and fishing rights exercised in a particular area will translate to a hunting or fishing right. This is plain from this Court's decisions in Van der Peet, Nikal, Adams and Côté. In those cases, aboriginal peoples asserted and proved ancestral utilization of particular sites for fishing and harvesting the products of the sea. Their forebears had come back to the same place to fish or harvest each year since time immemorial. However, the season over, they left, and the land could be traversed and used by anyone. These facts gave rise not to aboriginal title, but to aboriginal hunting and fishing rights.
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The Court of Appeal has rightly recognized that the Supreme Court is advocating caution. The Court of Appeal offers a second argument in favour of the proposition that
Marshall; Bernard supports the view that title must be claimed on a site-specific basis:
The majority's equation of sufficient occupancy for Aboriginal title with the common law requirements to show title by virtue of possession is also important. It supports the views that title must be claimed on a sitespecific basis, and that a certain regularity and intensity of presence is needed before it will count as "occupancy". Without this premise, we cannot accept the Court of Appeal's conclusion that McLachlin CJC's equation of occupancy with common law possession supports the view that sufficient occupancy requires site-specificity. 37 Supra note 5 at para 66. 38 Ibid at para 54.
Far from the Court of Appeal's finding that territorial claim is inconsistent with the jurisprudence, our discussion of Marshall; Bernard shows us that it is inconsistent to rule such a claim out. McLachlin CJC's equation of sufficient occupancy with common law possession entails not a predetermined level of specificity or intensity, but the need for a careful and contextual analysis of the facts to determine if a particular occupancy will satisfy the "core" of common law possessory title.
At this point then, we can say that the Court of Appeal's first argument for sitespecificity, drawing on previous statements in Delgamuukw and Marshall; Bernard, is not tenable. Neither case, nor the combination of the two, provided defensible justifications for the conclusion that sufficient occupancy need be site-specific.
We can now move to the second argument offered by the Court of Appeal in favour of the site-specific understanding of sufficient occupancy, outlined in brief by Groberman J here:
I do not see a broad territorial claim as fitting within the purposes behind s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 or the rationale for the common law's recognition of Aboriginal title.
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As the language suggests, this will be a purposive argument: the Court of Appeal aims to lay out its understanding of the telos of section 35 of the Constitution Act and the motivations for the recognition of title, and then argue that a territorial understanding of occupancy does not square with those purposes. The fallacy in the plaintiff's characterization of the defendants' positions as representing a "postage stamp" view of Aboriginal title is that it ignores the importance of Aboriginal rights other than title in protecting traditional culture and lifestyles.
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The Court of Appeal's suggestion is that the "postage stamp" view of title is a cartographical straw man, which the Trial Judge proceeds to knock down. According to Griberman J, the "fallacy" is that in casting the site-specific view of title as postagestamp, the plaintiff's fail to recognize the possibility of connecting particularly intensely used areas with broader areas in which certain other Aboriginal rights can be exercised.
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That is, we can connect the site-specific title areas with activity rights in order to achieve the goals of section 35. Groberman J puts it this way: 44 Supra note 2 at para 199. 45 Supra note 1 at para 171 46 Ibid at para 234. 47 Ibid at para 238. With the foregoing said, we can now say that the Court of Appeal has not provided us a persuasive purposive argument for a site-specific picture of title. As Groberman J himself emphasized, the telos of title is to protect exclusive occupation where that occupation is critical to the cultural identity of Aboriginal peoples. 51 The sufficient character or quality of that occupation should be indexed to the cultural significance of the occupation, not a narrow categorization of acceptable precision.
The final argument offered by the Court of Appeal for its dismissal of the "territorial" model is an argument from reconciliation. That is, the Court of Appeal argues that the site-specific model is concordant with the broad goal of reconciling
Aboriginal rights and wider Canadian interests, and that any more diffuse, non sitespecific interpretation does not further the reconciliatory imperative. As Groberman J writes of the site-specific view:
It seems to me that this view of Aboriginal title and Aboriginal rights is fully consistent with the case law. It is also consistent with broader goals of reconciliation. There is a need to search out a practical compromise that can protect Aboriginal traditions without unnecessarily interfering with Crown sovereignty and with the well-being of all Canadians. As I see it, an overly-broad recognition of Aboriginal title is not conducive to these goals. Lamer C.J.C.'s caution in Delgamuukw that "we are all here to stay" was not a mere glib observation to encourage negotiations. Rather, it was a recognition that, in the end, the reconciliation of Aboriginal rights with Crown sovereignty should minimize the damage to either of those principles.
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The argument seems to run as follows. The Court of Appeal first outlines what it takes to be the "broader goal of reconciliation," that is, the reaching of a practical compromise which on the one hand, protects Aboriginal traditions, while at the same time not 51 Supra note 1 at para 171. 52 Ibid at para 239.
unnecessarily interfering with Crown sovereignty and the welfare of Canadians writ large. If we take "principles" in the last sentence to be referring to the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests in tension, then the Court of Appeal is also suggesting that such a compromise should aim to limit the damage to both sets of concerns. To sum up then, Groberman J is forwarding a picture of reconciliation as a process of coming to a pragmatic arrangement that respects and minimally impairs the interests in tension or conflict. We can call this premise (1): (1) In the context of Aboriginal rights, reconciliation is a process of coming to a pragmatic arrangement or practical compromise respecting and minimally impairing the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests engaged.
Groberman J's next move is to argue that an overly-broad recognition of title, that is,
what the Court of Appeal sees as following from an endorsement of the "territorial"
understanding of sufficient occupancy, would hinder the possibility of achieving reconciliation. Presumably, though this is not stated, this is because an overly-broad recognition of title would lead to more title claims being made out in such a manner as to "minimally impair" any non-Aboriginal interests in play. As an unstated corollary, a more narrow, site-specific interpretation would lead to less impairment of third party interests. So, we can state the Court of Appeal's second premise as follows:
(2) A territorial or non-site-specific understanding of sufficient occupancy would increase the number of defensible Aboriginal title claims, and thus unnecessarily damage non-Aboriginal interests.
This leads us to the Court of Appeal's conclusion:
(3) From (1) and (2), it follows that we should not endorse a non site-specific interpretation of sufficient occupancy, because it is not consistent with minimalimpairment goal of reconciliation.
Premises (1) and (2) However, we do not have to accept this unstated premise. There is a way to separate juristic recognition of title and its complete enforcement. To explain, we must first rehearse an argument from Professor Slattery.
In the Metamorphosis, Professor Slattery has argued that the common law of Given this new reality, the common law did not remain idle but adapted to take account of the change in circumstances. The adaptation was shaped by three needs: to ensure the continuity of aboriginal title and its recognition in a modern form; to supply appropriate remedies for the wrongs visited on Indigenous peoples; and to accommodate public and private interests in the lands concerned. These needs gave rise to common law Principles of Reconciliation, which supplemented and modified the traditional Principles of Recognition applying at the time of Crown sovereignty.
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That is a new body of common law around title has emerged. Whereas the Principles of Recognition govern the nature and scope of aboriginal title at the time of Crown sovereignty, the Principles of Reconciliation govern the legal effects of title, in modern times. 58 The most important effect of these new principles is that they transform historical whose full implementation requires agreement between the Indigenous party and the Crown." 59 That is, the role of the court is to recognize core elements of a generative, right, enough to provide a foundation for negotiations and to ensure that the Indigenous party enjoys a significant portion of its rights pending the final agreement.
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The Principles of Recognition, then, function to signal the court's acknowledgement of the legitimacy of an Aboriginal group's title claim, grounded in the relationship between the group and the land in question. The Principles of Reconciliation "take as their starting point" the former, but also consider other factors, such as the later history of the land, the Indigenous group's contemporary interests, and third party and societal interests. 61 They then partially implement title as a generative right, and leave it to the parties to completely instantiate the right through a treaty or other negotiating process.
We are now in a position to return to our original point, that we need not assume that the recognition of Aboriginal title automatically entails its full enforcement, and thus, that we should not accept the Court of Appeal's argument from reconciliation for sitespecific occupancy. Professor Slattery argues that if we fail to distinguish between these two sets of principles, "we may fall into the trap of assuming that historical aboriginal that Lamer CJC held that the requirement that aboriginal activity rights be those that were "a central and significant part of the society's distinctive culture" also operates in a title claim. However, unlike the Van der Peet test for activity rights which explicitly requires a demonstration of an activity's central significance, such an explicit demonstration is not required in title analysis because the occupancy requirement for title makes it redundant. 71 As rehearsed above, Lamer CJC held that when the two prongs of the occupancy requirement (occupation and the maintenance of a substantial connection)
were satisfied, one could infer central significance. Recall also that we argued that 69 Supra note 2 at para 149. 70 Supra note 5 at para 66. 71 Supra note 2 at para 150.
neither of those prongs, in themselves, provide us with any ground for finding central significance. 72 As a result, we may be left unsatisfied and unwilling to accept that central significance is really entailed by the occupation requirement so understood.
That worry disappears on our proposed understanding of the occupancy question as a fact-specific inquiry seeking evidence of central significance. If we understand sufficient occupancy as occupancy which, on the facts, demonstrates central significance, the redundancy noted by the Chief Justice makes perfect sense. We need not ask about whether or not a claimed land has central significance to a group's cultural identity during a title claim, because one aspect of the test for that claim, namely, the occupancy requirement, itself aims at finding central significance.
In addition to offering a better explanation of the noted redundancy, our centralsignificance understanding of occupation may provide a concrete opportunity for the Court to consider the "Aboriginal perspective" during an analysis of title claim. The importance of taking the Aboriginal perspective on land into account was affirmed in
Delgamuukw:
This debate over the proof of occupancy reflects two divergent views of the source of aboriginal title. The respondents argue, in essence, that aboriginal title arises from the physical reality at the time of sovereignty, whereas the Gitksan effectively take the position that aboriginal title arises from and should reflect the pattern of land holdings under aboriginal law. Indeed, Lamer CJC goes further and holds that true reconciliation of aboriginal and nonaboriginal interests in land will require that our analysis of occupation and exclusivity place equal weight on both perspectives. 74 Taking up the aboriginal perspective includes, but is not limited to, referencing a claimant group's system of law.
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Our central-significance understanding of occupancy provides one substantive way in which the Aboriginal perspective can be taken into account during title analysis.
As argued above, the court would have to consider cultural-historical evidence that could substantiate a finding that exclusive occupation of the land was crucial to the cultural identity of the claimant group. This evidence would include the Aboriginal group's understanding of its own practices, traditions, and written and oral histories that speak to such a connection. That is, a judicial determination of sufficient occupancy would require the court's appreciation of the Aboriginal group's view of their own interest in the land.
Thus, our non-category based, central-significance understanding of the occupancy requirement is not only consistent with the previous leading jurisprudence, it also adds to it by filling some gaps of uncertainty in the existing case law.
To conclude, we have taken some small strides in understanding the conceptual and practical hornet's nest that is Aboriginal title. Further, we have provided reasons for not adopting the Court of Appeal's narrow interpretation of sufficient occupancy, and suggested that the whole site-specific/territorial debate is orthogonal to the central question at hand. Realizing this, we offered an alternative line of inquiry for determining specific occupancy, one that is fact-specific and indexed to a connection of central significance between a land claim and the cultural identity of the claimant group. 74 Ibid at para 156. 75 Ibid at para 147.
